to base a general analysis of the phenomenon, even though some of the conclusions to be ventured must be regarded as provisional.
What emerges at once is that none of the eighteenth-century Russian pretenders were puppets exploited by established poliiical interests in the sense that Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck had been in England. Moreover very few of them were simply adventurers or cranks as most of the pseudo-Louis XVIIs of France appear to have been. With rare excepeons they were indigenous products of the lowest orders of Russian society, and most of them oSered some programme for reform. On these grounds the pretender phenomenon in eighteenth-century Russia may be characterized as a manifestation of social protest alongside peasant flight, arson, banditry and uprising.9
Nevertheless there were seven pretenders who failed to conform to the general pattern, and it will be as well to dispose of these before reverting to the general theme. In the first place there was the celebrated "Princess Tarakanova" -a lady who used various aliases while pursuing a chequered and adventurous career through a number of European cities, including London, before declaring herself to be the daughter of the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna by Count Razumovskii (and the wrong Razumovskii at that: the Hetman, not her lover, the Master of the Hunt). She was eventually inveigled to Russia from Italy by Count Orlov on the instruciions of a distinctly unamused Empress Catherine II who promptly incarcerated her in the fortress of Saints Peter and Paul. "Princess Tarakanova" was an adventuress who operated outside Russia and will therefore be excluded from the investigation.
Also atypical was Opochinin, the son of a major-general in the Russian army who claimed to the product of a union between the Empress Elizabeth and George II of England (who was said to have visited Russia incognito in the suite of his own ambassador). Unlike Tarakanova, Opochinin did present a rudimentary political programme directed against Catherine and the Orlovs and towards placing her son Paul upon the throne. Nevertheless his inquisitors attributed his crime to "drunkenness and mental imbalance'',l? and his insignificance is further suggested by the fact that he seems to have been the only pretender not to have been severely punished.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tiumenev is another candidate for exclusion because of his atypical social position, while Andrei Ivanov (better known as Kondratyi Selivanov, founder of the skoptsy,ll the sect of self-castrators) constitutes a special case for different reasons. Although active during the eighteenth century he does not seem actually to have identified himself as Peter III until somewhat later (having been flogged for his proselytizing activities and sent to Siberia). Moreover his adherents not only believed him to be the "true tsar" but the incarnation of Jesus Christ as well. As we shall see, similar links between pretension and religious messianism are detectable in other cases, but Selivanov is exceptional in the passive spirituality of his appeal, which presents a sharp contrast to the more active forms of social protest characteristic of most pretenders.
Nikolai Kretov, a member of the gentry and an army captain serving with the garrison at Orenburg who suggested that he was the real tsar just at the time Pugachev began his rebellion in September the achon of a man who exploited the rumours of Peter III's survival (which were then rampant in the area) in order to take advantage of gullible peasants and extract money from them.
Finally, there are two more eighteenth-century pretenders who, though they may have had more in common with the archetypal pretender as I shall shortly define him, should be dismissed from the reckoning because, like Tarakanova, they made their claims abroad. One, who claimed to be Ivan Ivanov, son of Ivan V (and thus, by implication, brother of the Empress Anne) approached the Russian envoy at the Porte with this story in I747, and was promptly thrashed and sent off to Russia. The other, a fascinating figure not least in his significance in terms of a nascent Panslavism, was Stepan Malyi (Little Stephen, otherwise Stepan Rajcevic) another pseudo-Peter III who in I767 gained the allegiance of the feuding mountain tribes of Montenegro.
Having excluded these seven we may now proceed with an analysis of the remaining thirty-seven cases. In doing so we shall first establish when and where they staked their claims (attempting to account for the patterns which emerge) and also which monarchs they pretended to be. We shall then examine their careers -their social origins and occupations, their literacy, experience of the world outside their own communities, their marital status etc. --making cautious inferences from generalized evidence where precise biographical information is particularly scarce, as it is with regard to literacy, marital status and religion.
Having constructed a picture of the archetypal pretender we shall proceed to examine the phenomenon in relation to the prevailing peasant ideology and to popular and specific grievances as reflected in the various programmes advanced by individual pretenders. Next we shall discuss the problem of the pretenders' credibility and comment on the extent and social composition of the followings they were able to muster; evaluate the relevance of Old Belief to the phenomenon and also the importance of rumours about pretenders which swept various parts of Russia at different times during the century. Finally, certain conclusions (some less tentaiive than others) will be ventured about the nature and significance of the pretender phenomenon and the reasons for its decline.
It is immediately apparent that the distribution of pretenders through the century is very uneven. In the first decade of the eighteenth century only two pretenders are referred to (it should be borne in mind always that these must be regarded as minimum figures). In the second decade there were also two, followed by three in the 'twenties and five in the 'thirties. Yet in the following twenty years there is evidence of only four, including "Ivan Ivanov", who has been classified as atypical. In the I760S, by contrast, there were seven -in addition to the atypical Opochinin and Stepan Malyi; and in the 'seventies eight (and if one were to include Selivanov, Kretov, and Tarakanova, eleven). In the 'eighties there were another seven, but in the last decade of the century, only one, and he the dubious Colonel Tiumenev. The large concentration of some twenty-six pretenders in the reign of Catherine II (I762-96) iS striking. It cannot be accounted for simply by reference to the length of her reign or popular resentment engendered by a woman sitting on the throne, even though male chauvinism probably played some part. During Anne's reign, for instance, one pretender, Iakov Tatarinov observed that the empress "has long hair but a short mind''.l2 Yet Elizabeth, whose hair was just as long as Anne's, was challenged only three times during her twenty-year reign and only once, incidentally, by someone claiming to be the infant tsar she had deposed. Nor was it merely that Catherine was a foreigner. Catherine I had also been a foreigner, yet she experienced comparatively little trouble of this kind in her admittedly brief reign. Moreover, under Catherine II pretenders appeared in distinct clusters-there were no fewer than six in the years I764-5, another six between I772 and I774, and another five between I782 and I786, although these last attracted significantly less support than the others. The only other comparable concentration were three or four in I73I-2.
Of these four concentrations, one coincided with the Pugachev rising, in a period of intense social discontent; another occurred in its aftermath and owed much to that movement's effect in popularizing the legend of Peter III's survival. However, the concentrations in the 'thirties and mid-'sixties present something of a puzzle. Considerations of political legitimacy resentment of Anne's edict demanding an oath to an unnamed successor, and the accession of another empress (Catherine II) who had no Romanov blood in her veins though relevant, do not of themselves provide an adequate explanation (Elizabeth, who was illegitimate and had ousted an emperor of impeccably imperial descent, had very few pretenders to contend with). On the other hand, patterns of socio-economic change during the century, though still far from clear, go some way towards accounting for fluctuations in generalized discontent which influenced the numbers of pretenders produced -given Russia's cultural climate and the mentality of her overwhelmingly peasant population.
Tastes for increasingly luxurious living undoubtedly permeated the gentry during the period, inducing many of them to spend beyond their means and to squeeze their peasants more (not least, probably, in their capacity as official tax-collectors). However, XLhis was a coniinuous and cumulative process which began early in the century and reached its apogee uIlder Catherine the Great. The effect of increasing population (which in many areas resulted in a diminishing acreage available to feed each peasant) was also gradual. Both factors contributed to a rising tide of peasant discontent, but they cannot of themselves account for the first two clusters of pretenders.
Nor can the incidence of famine do so. Outbreaks of pretender activitynotablyfail to coincide withtheremarkable increases inryeprices which occurred in I735-8 and I749-5I -as does the fourth cluster of pretenders in the I780S which preceded the notorious famine of I787,13 rather than accompanying or following it as might have been expected. Wars, which served to trigger sharp outbursts of social protest under Peter I and again during the I770S, also fail to coincide with three out of the four main periods of pretender activity. Nevertheless, both the earlier clusters -like that of the I770S occurred at times when the economic conditions of the peasantry appear to have been deteriorating.
The 'thiriies proved to be an unusually hard iime for state peasants (that is non-seigneurial peasants living on state-owned property administered by the Treasury) in particular, and the 'sixties saw a marked rise in the demands made on the peasantry as a whole. These included a startling increase of 47 per cent in combined quitrent (obrok) and poll-tax demanded from serfs (that is privatelyowned, seigneurial peasants) ---compared vvith rises averaging only I5 per cent in the previous three decades, the rate of price inflation during the same period remaining steady by comparison-and a cumulative rise in indirect taxaiion which increased almost two and a half iimes between I 724 and I 769. I therefore incline to the view that discontent in eighteenth-century Russia, of which pretenders were a symptom, tended to be linked with deterioraiing rather than with improving economic conditions.l4
The appearance of seven or so pretenders under Peter the Great coincided with the generalized discontent during his reign; there followed a five-year lull in pretender activity during the reigns of Catherine I (under whom direct taxation was eased) and Peter II, and then a disiinct rise under Anne's harsh rule, followed by a marked drop under the popular Elizabeth. There was immense activity in the first two-thirds of Catherine II's reign; and then a sharp decline, coincident with some improvement in the legal and economic condition of the peasantry.
Of the forty-four pretenders, three, as we know, appeared abroad, and there is doubt about the precise area of operations of six others. Its population was sparser, and labour scarcer, than in the central regions. In consequence (the province of Voronezh apart) local lords were tending to demand more labour-service, as opposed to quitrent, of their serfs than was the case elsewhere,l5 labour-service tending to be a heavier, and more sharply increasing, burden even than quitrent. For the same reason, lords were vigorously extending their authority to neighbouring peasants and odnodvortsy,l 6 descendants of privileged landholding servicemen of the old froniier, who as a group were experiencing an exceptionally sharp decline in socioeconomic and legal status, and who were remarkably aciive in the pretender movements of the mid-'sixties.
The available statistics pertaining to regional variations in grain prices, famine-incidence, the proportion of serfs to state peasants, and the relative weight (as opposed to distribution) of quitrent and labour-service do not permit firm conclusions to be drawn as to why the geographical distribution of pretenders should have been as it was. Nevertheless, these regions were peculiar both in terms of their social composition and of their distinctive trends in socioagrarian relations (with once-free peasants undergoing a process of enserfment, and aspiring serfs, increasingly burdened, seeing the prospect of freedom recede over the years). This correlation suggests a causal relationship. So do the related facts that the regions concerned were adjacent to the Cossack settlements of the Don, the Volga, Zaporozh'e and the Iaik (Ural), from which all large-scale revolts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries emanated. 17 Moreover these peripheral areas seem to have been significantly less eEciently policed than were the central provinces, and the Volga region in particular was inhabited by an unusually high proportion of restless hired labourers and marginalized men.
Who did the pretenders claim to be? Some made generalized claims, purporting to be a non-specific emperor or autocrat, but most of them assumed the name of a particular tsar or tsarevich. Alexei was still alive and indeed before his final break with his father. Furthermore, half of the "Alexeis" appeared not, as might be expected, under Catherine I (who was, after all, a foreigner of humble descent) but under Anne. One of them presented himself as Peter, son of Peter the Great by Catherine; and another, Ivan Evdokimov, put himself out to be Peter II-and that no less than thirty-five years after the real Peter II's death. There were, in addition, three false Ivan VIs and three who claimed to be Catherine II's son Paulthese also when the real Paul was still alive. As against this there were no fewer than sixteen false Peter IIIs-the first of them in I764, two years after the real Peter's death.
So far as the social origins and occupations of the pretenders are concerned, at least ten were peasants -that is more than a third of those whose status has been established. Three of the ten are described as serfs, one as a peasant of a monastic estate, and four were court peasants (that is peasants belonging to estates of the imperial family). Of the rest, five were Cossacks, and no fewer than four were odnodvortsy (a surprisingly large number from a relaiively small social group) while one was the son of an impoverished reitar (mounted officer). Semikov was the son of a Siberian sexton but born in the Ukraine, and Andrei Khol'shchevikov, was a posadskii chelovek (registered member of a commercial suburb). Ivan Minitskii, supposedly descended from a Polish shliakAtich (member of the nobility), is described simply as a worker; Anton Aslanbekov, who posed as Peter III, was a merchant of Armenian origins; Casteral8 describes yet another as a shoemaker.
In view of this, and bearing in mind the exceptions listed earlier, the pretender syndrome in Russia was clearly a phenomenon of the lower social orders. Moreover many pretenders, more particularly those belonging to marginal social groups like the Cossacks and odnodvortsy, are known to have personally experienced a fall in economic status.
It might reasonably be argued, of course, that the mass of Russians belonged to the lower orders, who for much of the period under review seem to have been experiencing economic diEculties. But there is at least one factor which distinguishes the pretenders from their fellows: extra-community experience.
The vast majority of Russians were peasants or near-peasants. Peasants are notorious for their conservatism, backwardness and ignorance of the outside world, their lives being dominated by the traditions of the isolated village and by the grinding demands of the peasant farm. Clearly anyone from such a background who tries to enlist his fellows in any massive movement of social protest-and it appears, as we shall see, that many if not most of the pretenders were trying to do so must somehow have broken the bounds of these considerable constraints. In effect, he must have had some experience of the outside world, insofar as he must realize that people in other villages and communities have similar grievances to his own.
Such experience might conceivably be gained at second handfrom the gossip of pedlars and other rare visitors from the world outside, from tradesmen in a nearby town, from merchants and other peasants at a fair. It could also be gained from reading. However, there was comparatively little printed literature in eighteenth-century Russia and virtually none that was overtly hostile to the established power. Moreover, the vast majority of eighteenth-century Russians were illiterate. It is doubtful if as many as one peasant in a hundred could read at all, and though literacy was somewhat higher among merchants and tradesmen, these categories do not seem to have figured very prominently among the ranks of the pretenders.
Only three of the eighteenth-century Russian pretenders (excluding the oddities from the gentry class) had learned to write or read. At 8 per cent of the total this is a higher proportion than might have been expected. But most pretenders had gained the experience which qualified them to act, or to attempt to act, as cultural brokers between the outside world and the villagers they tried to raise to their cause by direct means -and not at second hand. Their eyes were opened by what they themselves had seen and heard and suffered in the outside world.
By far the most common sort of experience was military service. At least thirteen of the pretenders had served in the army, that is about 40 per cent an extraordinarily large proportion in view of the fact that no more than about 3 or 4 per cent of all male Russians could have done military service.
However, army service was by no means the only way. A very high proportion had fallen foul of the law and were fugitives of one kind or another. It is a striking characteristic of pretenders that they wandered about the country extensively -their equivalent of going into the wilderness, as it were, before leading their people to the promised land. Several of them had also experienced life in prison, had suffered floggings and other punishments. Fedor Kamenshchikov who, in I764, proclaimed himself to be Peter III was one such; Nikolai Shliapnikov (the "Tsarevich Paul" of I782), who had served a hard-labour sentence at Taganrog, was another. At least one can be classed as a professional brigand Grigorii Riabov from Astrakhan', the leader of a band of robbers who had escaped from a hard-labour sentence at Nerchinsk. Two more, Khripunov and Khanin, had been involved in the Pugachev movement. 19 Others, of course, gained their experience more or less legally as petty traders, by working for merchants or boat-hauling. Work in transport constituted one of the more obvious means by which a man might gain experience of the outside world. Conversely, workers in the transport industry were among the most important disseminators of news to the isolated peasantry. From this point of view it is probably no chance that the Volga, one of the chief routes of communicaiion, figures so often in the story of peasant protest in Russia.
Nevertheless there was usually a military and/or criminal record of some sort. To give some brief biographical examples: Ivan Evdokimov was born in I722, was recruited into the army but deserted in I747, whereupon he spent the next eighteen years on the run. Fedor Bogomolov was born on Count R. I. Vorontsov's estate at Saransk, ran away to Saratov as a child, worked on boats for a merchant and for Cossack settlers, and travelled extensively as a hired worker in south-east Russia before being enrolled in the Moscow Legion under the pseudonym Fedot Kazin. Khanin was also a runaway, an itinerant hired hand, who had served in the army and acquired a criminal record for robbery quite apart from serving Pugachev. Ivan Kurdilov, the Courland pretender of I788, had wandered right across Russia as far south as Zaporozh'e and the Crimea, while Pugachev himself, the most successful of them all, was a Don Cossack deserter who had fought as far afield as Germany, had experienced life in gaol and travelled widely about southern Russia before declaring himself to be Peter III to the Iaik Cossacks.
Besides travelling quite widely in the world outside the village, a large proporiion of pretenders had thus also received some brutalizing experiences. Indeed, the archetypal pretender seems to have 9 There were other linkages between various pretender movements. In I732 the false Tsarevich Peter Petrovich (Larion Starodubtsev) proposed joint operations with the false Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich (Timofei Trushenik)i two Don Cossacks who supported the pretender Grigorii Riabov had been involved in the Bogomolov movement, and some Iaik Cossacks who had followed Pugachev were later involved with the pretender Khanin.
been an embittered man motivated initially by the injusiices he had suffered at the hands of the authorities. He was tough and desperate, a man for whom even the considerable risks of punishment up to and including the death penalty seemed worth taking, provided the stakes were high enough.
All in all, the archetypal pretender seems to conform pretty closely to the social bandit as defined by Eric Hobsbawm.20 As we have seen, outlawed runaways, deserters and bandits figure prominently among them; and insofar as peasant flight, or desertion from the army, made a man an outlaw, and the condiiion of outlawry often forced a man to banditry as a means of subsistence, this is hardly surprising. Moreover it would seem that since the government, in defining both the law and the outlaw, blurred distinctions between runaways and other criminals, discontented peasants who identified with runaways tended to sympathize with outlaws generally, whatever their crime, regarding them as social rebels who stood up against a regime which they themselves hated too. Certainly a bandit subculture similar to that of Mexico in Zapata's time existed in eighteenthcentury Russia. The many songs and legends of the period which glorify the outlaw provide additional tesiimony to that fact.2l
Men like Hobsbawm's typical bandit (the young unmarried or divorced man, the shepherd, cowherd or military man, the watcher rather than the watched, the stiff-necked peasant standing out against injustice) are thus to be found not only among the leaders of the bigger insurgencies of the seventeenth as well as of the eighteenth century (notably Bolotnikov, Razin, Bulavin, and Pugachev and most of their chief lieutenants), but also among the pretenders who led less successful movements. Cossacks were fishermen and herdsmen; deserters were, or had been, military men; convicts were often men who stood out against perceived injustices, as were peasants who risked punishment by fleeing from their lords. However, there are some divergencies from the Hobsbawm prototype. Young unmarried men, for example, did not predominate among the Russian pretenders of the eighteenth eentury. Of the tell who derived from the lower orders of soeiety and whose ages have been established, the youngest was eighteen and the oldest fifty. Their average age was thirty-six to thirty-seven. Again, while there is little reliable information about their marital status, we know that a high proportion of them were peasants of one kind or another, and that it was usual for peasants (exeepting those drafted into the army in their youth), as also for Cossacks, to marry at a comparatively early age. The average age of thirty-six to thirty-seven is therefore reasonably old in the eontext of eighteenth-century Russia old enough to be married and have children if pretenders conformed to soeial norms. Young men, therefore, so far from constituting the majority, were exeeptional among pretenders, and it seems reasonable to assume that many were family men.
The arehetypal pretender was a would-be revolutionary, albeit of a primitive type, a man who exploited the deviee of pretension as the only possible means of aequiring the neeessary eharisma to raise mass support among the Russian people. In order to explain this interpretation one must eonsider the mentality of the illiterate, isolated and culturally baekward peasantry, people for whom the demareation lines between objeetive reality, perceived view of the world, and imaginative flight of faney beeame blurred when they attempted to account for changes affecting their lives whieh emanated from outside the village a world of whieh most had little knowledge and no experience.
The ideology of the Russian peasant consisted of two basic and related eoncepts. Firstly, they had an idea of natural justiee (the land really belongs to us; the landlord or official has no right to make sueh demands of me, etc.); and seeondly a belief (also prevalent in medieval England, for example) that the monarch was always just.22 When these two notions were shown to be incompatible and irreconeilable, as they often were, reeourse was had to some imaginative, but nonetheless rational deviee which served both to maintain the validity of the basie eoneepts and to legiiimize revolt namely, a belief that the monareh, in aeting unjustly, was being misled by evil advisers; that these evil eourtiers were perverting the monareh's instruetions ( be palpably unjust (if he had lost charisma in the Weberian sense), that he or she could not be the real monarch at all, but must be a usurper. The corollary of this, a tsar-less Russia being inconceivable, was the belief that the real tsar, the just tsar, was wandering about the country waiting for his people to restore him to the throne, whereupon he would remedy their grievances.23
The rationalistic myth of the monarch as usurper had been born, apparently, during the reign of Boris Godunov following the extinction of the Riurikid dynasty and had gained force during the "Time of Troubles" early in the seventeenth century. The succession crises of the eighteenth century served to strengthen its popularity as a means of legitimizing social action, and " just tsars", however doubtful their credentials, became increasingly effective in rallying fractionalized groups of discontented people. Indeed, by the latter part of the eighteenth ceIltury, with a real usurper on the throne, only a pretender could serve as a magnet to attract mass support for an insurrectionary grass-roots movement directed towards change.
This particular mythology was related to others which were religiously rather than politically orientated. Peasants trained in the vocabulary of Russian Orthodoxy tended, not unnaturally, to interpret mysterious goings-on in the outside world in terms of miracles and apocalyptic happenings, and peasant aspirations were commonly expressed in terms of salvation rather than of mundane change. Many pretenders communicated in such terms to their potential followers, and their adherents often regarded them as messianic saviours. Timofei Truzhenik was only one of many to talk of miracles. Aslanbekov "cured people", and his parting cry was "Save me: I am your God on earth".24 The followers of Gavrila Kremnev claimed to see the stigmata of the Holy Cross upon his feet; Nikita Seniutin prophesied that his followers would be free of their lords in exactly nine months' time; and the followers of Selivanov, of course, believed him to be Christ as well as tsar.25
Yet the element of fantasy in such claims to be an apocalyptic agent was grounded in a certain rationality -given a situaiion in which social change could only be obtained by, and expressed in terms of, some formula of legitimacy. Moreover such fantastic claims did not obviate the need for a practical political programme, crude though its expression usually was.
Andrei Khol'shchevikov was exceptional in apparently making no promises and yet gaining a following. Truzhenik, by contrast, advanced one of the more far-reaching programmes, promising not only to reward his followers with gold, silver and bread, but to abolish the poll-tax, to put all the unjust aristocrats on trial, and, more particularly, to relieve the odnodvortsy from the onerous local watch-service duties-for he staked his claim in Tambov Pugachev's programme was the most far-reaching of all, but his promises tended to become broader as his campaign proceeded and his movement lasted longer than the others. Of Pugachev's successors, Khanin promised to kill all the "great" people in the Empire; Khripunov (who claimed to be Pugachev as well as Peter III) apparently limited his programme to nine years' tax-relief; Seniutin and he was not alone in this -promised complete peasant emancipation.
Most pretenders, then) reinforced their appeal as the just tsar with specific promises calculated to appeal to the discontented, and from these promises we can gain some idea of what the more general sources of discontent were. Grievances were usually focused against 26 Quoted by Troitskii, Op. Cit. the gentry and particularly against the "great men" who ruled Russia; resentment of the poll-tax was expressed in almost every instance, while more specific complaints tended to relate to particular social groups-the once-autonomous Cossacks beginning to feel the heavy hand of central government; odnodvorlsy whose resources failed to match the demands made upon them and who were consequently being sucked down to peasant level; Old Believers suffering religious persecution.
Nevertheless, however favourably disposed a group of disaffected people might be towards a "just tsar" come among them, a pretender did not usually take their gullibility entirely for granted, whatever he promised. Tatarinov's followers, in I740, might have been satisfied with his bold assertion that he was "born and called to be tsar over all the state", but fabricated "proofs" of title were commonly provided in order to reinforce a claim. Kamenshchikov, the false Peter III of I764, for example, brandished two mysterious printed decrees (in fact copies of the official announcement of Elizabeth's death and the oath to Peter III) to prove his identity. Weals, pock-marks and scrofula scars were revealed as imperial birth-marks, and sometimes a pretender took an accomplice in tow to vouch for him. Thus Gavrila Kremnev was supported by a priest who claimed to have been a cantor at court where he had helped to educate the real Peter, and could therefore assure all comers that this Kremnev really was the emperor.
A negative requirement in maintaining the credibility of a pretension was, of course, to avoid any situation in which the false emperor might be recognized for the ordinary mortal he really was. It is for this reason apparently that most pretenders took the precaution of staking their claims in an area far distant from their places of origin. Pugachev, a Don Cossack, appeared near Kazan'; Artem'ev came from Simbirsk but registered his pretence at Astrakhan', and so on.
Pretenders also had to account for their sudden reappearances perhaps years after their reported deaths. Pugachev claimed to have spent eleven years wandering abroad as far afield as Egypt and Constantinople, and Evdokimov presented one of the more engaging alibis, explaining his thirty-five-year absence from the scene as Peter II by asserting he had been kidnapped by a group of courtiers while out hunting and taken to Italy where he had languished in prison for twenty-four and a half years, after which passage of time he had finally managed to escape.
One might imagine that a pretender also needed to look the part he played if he was to attract any considerable following. Yet it is unlikely that many of them bore much resemblance to the real tsars and tsarevichs they impersonated, and none of the many "Peter IIIs" is known to have spoken German. However, a few imperial trappings, a minimal display of pomp and, above all, some talent as an actor, seem to have been sufficient to produce an impression consistent with the popular image of a monarch. Pugachev's own appearance, for example, was not altogether prepossessing, yet when wearing a fine red coat, a large silver medal and the sash of the Order of St. Anne he was transformed in the eyes of his followers. Moreover he could also talk impressively and movingly, shedding tears "whenever he wanted to, which served to convince the simple people that what he told them was the truth",27 and he bore himself well in short he played his charismaiic role convincingly. Minitskii, alias the Tsarevich Alexei, was another to provide himself with a minimal aura of pomp, having church bells rung and guns fired off to mark his entrance into a Ukrainian village, whereupon priests were persuaded to lead their flocks forward in submission to kiss the cross he held before them. Once a following had been collected, it was common to form an imperial entourage. Pugachev formed a court, his cronies assuming the scyles and iitles of notabilities who surrounded the Empress Catherine. Kremnev was accompanied by a spurious "Count Rumiantsev" and a "General Pushkin", while Peter Chernyshev also had "generals" in his retinue. Such masquerades reinforced a pretender's credibility. Yet by no means all who followed actually believed the claims their false tsar made. There was collusion both explicit and unspoken. Many followers, though sceptical, evidently wished to believe; some pretended to believe in order to further the common cause. Iaik Cossacks, as one of them confirmed, noticed Pugachev's "quickness and ability" and therefore decided to "make him lord over us".28 So a successful pretender had to be credible as a leader, not simply as a tsar -the ability to inspire confidence, to carry conviction and to dissemble being as much requirements for successful pretenders as they are for successful politicians.
Pretension constituted an overt challenge to established authority. It was quintessentially sediiious and its practitioners were severely punished. Krekshin, who was flogged and exiled for fifteen years, The frequency with which "white" (secular) clergy were involved throws an illuminaiing sidelight on the shady phenomenon of pretension, suggesting that wide sections of the rural clergy were disaffected -or at least rather more sympathetic to the people they lived among than to the authorities whose interests and image they were intended to promote. How many of them were more or less covert Old Believers it is impossible to guess, but the south-eastern regions, so favoured by pretenders, were strong centres of Old province to the effect that Peter III was alive, in hiding and due to reappear. Similar rumours were reported in Kursk and St. Petersburg in I764, in Astrakhan' in I767 and in Schlusselburg in I769 by which time a belief in Peter's continued existence had become endemic in south-eastern Russia.
In I772 an odnodvorets called Trofim Klishin was caught disseminating the information that Peter was living among the Don Cossacks; in I776 a Ukrainian, Dmitrii Popovich, was found wandering over the southern steppes declaring Peter to be alive (and suggesting that he himself was of princely origin); and similar rumours, spread by soldiers, odnodvortsy and peasants, remained prevalent throughout the 'seventies. Towards the end of the 'eighties, however, they subsided and continued to do so thereafter, as did the incidence of pretenders themselves.
Some of these rumours may relate to actual pretenders who were never tracked down or to rebellious characters preparing to proclaim themselves tsar (it being a frequent device for pretenders to test out the ground with some care before declaring themselves to talk of the "real tsar's" existence, then hint at something like royal blood before finally committing themselves). Certainly the prevalence of such rumours which may legitimately be regarded as a legend of hope for the oppressed -created an environment in which pretenders might flourish, and probably encouraged would-be pretenders to declare themselves.
Strong and widespread currents of rumour were noted in I763-4, for example, at a time when no pretender is known to have appeared for several years, and immediately preceding a sudden crop of them. Such rumours also seem to have kept the idea strongly in popular consciousness, especially in south-eastern Russia between I767 and I772, when Bogomolov created such excitement and where he was shortly to be succeeded by other pretenders including Pugachev himself.
This discussion of the pretender phenomenon suggests the following conclusions. First, the general coincidence between periods of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the incidence of pretender movements (with peaks during Anne's reign, in the mid-'sixties and again the 'seventies); the promises to effect social and economic improvements which the pretenders made; and the fact that the vast majority of them derived from the ranks of the oppressed are consistent with the view that pretender movements were movements of social protest.
By extension it may be suggested that most pretenders (a very high proportion of whom were runaways, deserters, brigands or branded as outlaws for some other reason) were would-be leaders of peasant revolts men whose own sense of grievance allied to their knowledge of widespread discontent gained through their extensive travels as fugitives around the countryside ("I have been in the Ukraine, on the Don and in many towns in Russia", remarked Pugachev on one occasion, "and everywhere I have seen the people ruined"),32 induced them to attempt to solve their own diEculties, or take revenge on their oppressors, by canalizing the discontent of others. Thirdly, pretension to be the just and rightful tsar was not only a traditional means of attracting mass support for a movement of social protest, it soon became virtually the only way, given the cultural climate of rural Russia at that time. The image of the just tsar was one of great strength; it could bestow on a potential leader the necessary charisma, invest him with the magic properties of a leader-hero, unite various classes of the oppressed, offer them hope, and induce them to take action under a banner of legitimacy. Given the absence of revolutionary ideology in the Marxist sense and of any continuing organization around which opposition by the lower social strata could crystallize, pretension provided the only effective boost to get a revolutionary movement off the ground. Nevertheless, to achieve any measure of success, a pretender had to offer a minimum credibility. He had to play his chosen role effectively, offer convincing alibis, reveal an imperial birthmark or siigmata, live like an emperor (preferably surrounded by "nobles" and "generals"), and above all make promises consistent with those which a just tsar might be expected to make (usually a matter of expressing the peasants' aspirations).
Although pretenders continued to appear until well into the nineteenth century and some Populists were to toy with the idea of exploiting the myth of the "tsar-liberator" as a means of articulating diffuse peasant discontent and concerting it into revolutionary action,33 the numbers declined sharply after the I780S. 
